Sales slow to pick up FIGURE 1 SALES OF FARMLAND, 1991-92
A recent World Bank-sponsored survey of pri-(annual average percentage of survey area) vate farmers in Eastern and Central Europe 0.6 found a generally low level of sales and a high level of short-term land transactions compared 0. 4 with more mature markets such as the United be willing to use their land as collateral, most While the reluctance to buy and sell is undersaid no (table 1) . Moreover, banks are relucstandable, the need to revive the farming sectant to accept farmland as collateral-although tor is important and urgent-agriculture some will accept centrally located urban land. ' currently accounts for about 27 percent of The survey indicates that the more market-ori-employment and 15-20 percent of GDP in the ented the banks, the more reluctant they are region. More secure leasing can help. to enter into the high risks currently associated with farming. When banks do lend to farmLeases are efficient ers, they tend to make only short-term loans (not for land) and they prefer movable propOn both equity and efficiency grounds, shorterty such as crops, animals, and personal asterm leases are frequently perceived as "secsets as collateral. Only in Poland were banks ond-best" tenure options compared with willing to lend to farmers to buy land, probowner-operated arrangements. Yet, although long-term leases and ownership are crucial for an expanded set of contracting options, includcreating the right incentives for long-term ining purchase and sale, becomes available in vestment, short-term leases seem to be predeveloped markets (United Kingdom). This patferred during periods of economic instability.
tern is consistent with the gestation period reRecent theoretical and empirical work has quired for stabilizing the macroeconomic shown that these leasing arrangements may be environment and developing institutions to remore efficient under conditions of high risk duce enforcement and information costs. These aversion, imperfect information, high enforceinstitutions become increasingly important as ment costs, lumpy inputs, imperfect credit marparties move from short-term informal agreekets, or missing insurance markets-conditions ments to agreements entailing up-front comthat are common in transition economies. 3 mitments and longer investment horizons. Leases work well in these circumstances because agreements frequently take place between neighbors and within communities, substantially lowering the cost of information BOX 1 TITLES AND LEASES IN THE BALANCE and of formal contract enforcement. The leases make it easier to adjust the size of farming units There are two main differences between property rights transferred in a way that reflects changes in the relative throughtieandthosetransferredthrotghaleaseagreement cost of land, labor, and finance. Short-term thE t:entostaserdhoghlaegenet cost of land, labor,,and finance. Short-tern prDoperty rights transferred through thle are perpetual while those leases are also likely to ease common anxieties about corruption, speculation, and mass transferred through lease are time-bound, and property rights dispossession of farmland by absentee landtransferred through title usually encompass all ownership rights lords. And finally, because leasing allows short-(mainly the rights to possess, use, transfr, and derive income from term and repeated transactions, uncertainty propertyq while those transferred through lease agreements about the market value of future production is :
abssout the markbletmvalue. offutureproductioni encompass only a subset of such rights. Short-term leases typically less of a problem.
include use rights only.The longer theterm ofthe lease and the more Leasing arrangements are important not only rightstheleaseagreementtransferslincludingtransferandmortgage as mechanisms for farm restructuring, but also rlghts), the more leaseholders' rights come to resemble those of as catalysts in developing mature land markets.
titleholders. Price signals obtained through short-term contracts provide the information on land value and risk assessment that potential buyers and banks need, and thus help to strengthen land
What to do?
markets.
Although these short-term leasing arrangements Policymakers often prescribe land titling as the are frequently informal, they need not be. necessary catalyst for "jump starting" markets.
Simple measures to reduce information and enBut national titling programs can take decades forcement costs can go a long way toward widto complete. As important as titling is for the ening the scope of transactions beyond the long-term development of land markets, it is immediate community and increasing security neither necessary nor sufficient to permit farmof tenure. At a minimum, contracting parties land transactions in the short to medium term.
need to know who owns what.
Typically, policymakers can expect to see an A proper set of policy measures to promote evolving pattern of land transactions. Informal short-term land transfers should include: agreements dominate at the early stages of tran-* Field adjudication and registration of land sition (Bulgaria, Romania), leasing contracts rights. Adjudication and registration are necdominate at later stages (Hungary, Poland), and essary prerequisites of formal land transac-tions. (Even collective farms should be ento experience delayed disbursement because couraged to delineate plots for each memit takes so long to create secure, transferable, ber. Members of the collective do not have and mortgageable titles. A better option is to to work independent of one another, but design projects that: should have the option of doing so or of * Facilitate short-term land transactions through engaging in tenancy arrangements with one simple registration, enforcement of rights, and another.) Officers trained in simple surveyprovision of market information. ing techniques and legal principles could pro-* Provide the legal and institutional means vide adjudication in the field, settling disputes through which individuals and communities and demarcating boundaries in the presence could opt for more formal rights and secured of all concerned. The adjudication process transactions in the long run. results in a preliminary register of land rights. land. These restrictions, put in place to stop 2 Here, collectiverefers both to privatized sovkhozesand to kolkhozes.
"speculation an "profiteering,"
have rThe distinctions are not important for the purposes of this Note.
"speculation" and "profiteering," have re-
Unlike the owners and operators of industrial and commercial ceived less attention from reformers than corporations, who tend to be separate parties, colletive farmmemrestrictions on land sales even though they bers tend to be both the operators and the would-be owners
This series is published are potentially more distortionary during volvig deasionmaking po9 er to idructurid g mould require deto share ideas and invite transition. tenancy-based contracts as market signals.
